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ABSTRACT
Community-based question answering platforms can be rich
sources of information on a variety of specialized topics, from
finance to cooking. The usefulness of such platforms depends
heavily on user contributions (questions and answers), but
also on respecting the community rules. As a crowd-sourced
service, such platforms rely on their users for monitoring
and flagging content that violates community rules.
Common wisdom is to eliminate the users who receive
many flags. Our analysis of a year of traces from a mature
Q&A site shows that the number of flags does not tell the
full story: on one hand, users with many flags may still con-
tribute positively to the community. On the other hand,
users who never get flagged are found to violate community
rules and get their accounts suspended. This analysis, how-
ever, also shows that abusive users are betrayed by their
network properties: we find strong evidence of homophilous
behavior and use this finding to detect abusive users who go
under the community radar. Based on our empirical obser-
vations, we build a classifier that is able to detect abusive
users with an accuracy as high as 83%.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.4.2 [Computers and Society]: Social Issues—Abuse
and crime involving computers
Keywords
Community question answering; content abusers; crowdsourc-
ing
1. INTRODUCTION
Community-based Question-Answering (CQA) sites, such
as Yahoo Answers, Quora and Stack Overflow, are now rich
and mature repositories of user-contributed questions and
answers. For example, Yahoo Answers (YA), launched in
December 2005, has more than one billion posted answers,1
and Quora, one of the fastest growing CQA sites has seen
three times growth in 2013.2
1http://www.yanswersbloguk.com/b4/2010/05/04/1-
billion-answers-served/
2http://www.goo.gl/MfK83y
Like many other Internet communities, CQA platforms
define community rules and expect users to obey them. To
enforce these rules, published as community guidelines and
terms of services, these platforms provide users with tools to
flag inappropriate content. In addition to community moni-
toring, some platforms employ human monitors to evaluate
abuses and determine the appropriate responses, from re-
moving content to suspending user accounts.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to
investigate the reporting of rule violations in YA, one of
the oldest, largest, and most popular CQA platforms. The
outcomes of this study could aid human monitors with au-
tomated tools in order to maintain the health of the com-
munity. Our sampled dataset contains 10 million editorially
curated abuse reports posted between 2012 and 2013, and
1.5 million users who submitted content during the one-year
observation period, with about 9% of the users having their
accounts suspended. We use suspended accounts as a ground
truth of bad behavior in YA, and we refer to these users as
content abusers.
We discover that, although used correctly, flags do not
tell accurately which users should be suspended: while 32%
of the users active in our observation period have at least
one flag, only 16% of them are suspended during this time.
Even considering the top 1% users with the largest number
of flags, only about 50% of them deserve account suspension.
Moreover, we see that users with lots of flags contribute pos-
itively to the community in terms of providing (even best)
answers. Complicating an already complex problem, we find
that 40% of the suspended users have not received any flags.
To reduce this large gray area of questionable behavior, we
employ social network analysis tools in an attempt to under-
stand the position of content abusers in the YA community.
We learned that the follower-followee social network tun-
nels user attention not only in terms of generating answers
to posted questions, but also in monitoring user behavior.
More importantly, it turns out that this social network di-
vulges information about the users who go under the com-
munity radar and never get flagged even if they seriously
violate community rules. This network-based information,
combined with user activity, leads to accurate detection of
the “bad guys”: our classifier is able to distinguish between
suspended and fair users with an accuracy as high as 83%.
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses
previous analysis of CQA platforms and the existing body
of work on unethical behavior in online communities in gen-
eral. Section 3 presents the YA functionalities relevant to
this study and the dataset used. We introduce a deviance
score in Section 4 that identifies the pool of bad users more
accurately than the number of flags alone. Section 5 demon-
strates that deviant users are not all bad: despite their high
deviance score, in aggregate their presence in the commu-
nity is beneficial. Section 6 shows the effects of the social
network on user contribution and behavior. Section 7 shows
the classification of suspended and fair users. We discuss
the impact of these results in Section 8.
2. RELATED WORK
We collate past research on Community-based Question
Answering (CQA) in five categories depending on whether it
has dealt with content, users, new applications, bad behavior
in online settings, or CQA communication networks.
Content. Research in this area has investigated textual
aspects of questions and answers. In so doing, it has pro-
posed algorithmic solutions to automatically determine: the
quality of questions [14, 28] and answers [25, 1], the extent
to which certain questions are easy to answer [9, 24], and the
type of a given question (e.g., factual or conversational) [13].
Users. Research on CQA users has been mostly about
understanding why users contribute content: that is, why
users ask questions (askers are failed searchers, in that, they
use CQA sites when web search fails [15]); and why they
answer questions (e.g., they refrain from answering sensitive
questions to avoid being reported for abuse and potentially
lose access to the community [7]).
New applications. As for applications, research has pro-
posed effective ways of recommending questions to the most
appropriate answerers [23, 29], of automatically answering
questions based on past answers [26], and of retrieving fac-
tual answers [4] or factual bits within an answer [31].
Bad behavior in online settings. Qualitative and
quantitative studies of bad behavior in online settings have
been done before including newsgroups [22], online chat com-
munities [27], and online multiplayer video games [5]. A
body of work also investigates the impact of the bad behav-
ior. Researchers find that bad behavior has negative effects
on the community and its members: it decreases commu-
nity’s cohesion [32], performance [10] and participation [6].
In the worst case, users who are the targets of bad behavior
may leave or avoid online social spaces [6].
Communication networks. The communication net-
works behind CQA sites have been recently studied. More
specifically, researchers have explored the relationship be-
tween content quality and network properties such as num-
ber of followers [30] and tie strength [21].
Research on CQA communication networks is quite re-
cent, so it comes as no surprise that there has not been any
work on how such networks mediate different types of be-
havior on CQA sites. This paper, for the first time, sheds
light on bad behavior in CQA communities by studying YA,
one of the largest and oldest such communities. It quanti-
fies how YA’s networks channel user attention, and how that
results in different behavioral patterns that can be used to
limit bad behavior.
3. YAHOO ANSWERS
After 9 years of activity, YA has 56M monthly visitors
(U.S. only).3 The functionalities of the YA platform and
the dataset used in this analysis are presented next.
3.1 The Platform
YA is a CQA platform in which community members ask
and answer questions on various topics. Users ask questions
and assign them to categories selected from a predefined
taxonomy, e.g., Business & Finance, Health, and Politics
& Government. Users can find questions by searching or
browsing through this hierarchy of categories. A question
has a title (typically, a short summary of the question), and
a body with additional details.
A user can answer any question but can post only one
answer per question. Questions remain open for four days
for others to answer. However, the asker can select a best
answer before the end of this 4-day period, which automat-
ically resolves the question and archives it as a reference
question. The best answer can also be rated between one to
five, known as answer rating. If the asker does not choose
a best answer, the community selects one through voting.
The asker can extend the answering duration for an extra
four days. The questions left unanswered after the allowed
duration are deleted from the site. In addition to questions
and answers, users can contribute comments to questions
already answered and archived.
YA has a system of points and levels to encourage and
reward participation.4 A user is penalized five points for
posting a question, but if she chooses a best answer for her
question, three points are given back. A user who posts an
answer receives two points; a best answer is worth 10 points.
A leaderboard, updated daily, ranks users based on the total
number of points they collected. Users are split into seven
levels based on their acquired points (e.g., 1-249 points: level
1, 250-999 points: level 2, ..., 25000+ points: level 7). These
levels are used to limit user actions, such as posting ques-
tions, answers, comments, follows, and votes: e.g., first level
users can ask 5 questions and provide 20 answers in a day.
YA requires its users to follow the Community Guide-
lines that forbids users to post spam, insults, or rants, and
the Yahoo Terms of Service [2] that limits harm to minors,
harassment, privacy invasion, impersonation and misrepre-
sentation, and fraud and phishing. Users can flag content
(questions, answers or comments) that violates the Com-
munity Guidelines and Terms of Service using the “Report
Abuse” functionality. Users click on a flag sign embedded
with the content and choose a reason between violation of
the community guidelines and violation of the terms of ser-
vice. Reported content is then verified by human inspectors
before it is deleted from the platform.
Users in YA can choose to follow other users, thus creating
a follower-followee relationship used for information dissem-
ination. The followee’s actions (e.g., questions, answers, rat-
ings, votes, best answer, awards) are automatically posted
on the follower’s newsfeed. In addition, users can follow
questions, in which case all responses are sent to the follow-
ers of that question.
3http://www.listofsearchengines.org/qa-search-engines
4https://answers.yahoo.com/info/scoring system
3.2 Dataset
We studied a sample of 10 million abuse reports posted
between 2012 and 2013 originating from 1.5 million active
users. These users are connected via 2.6 million follower-
followee relationships in a social network (referred to as FF
in this study) that has 165, 441 weakly connected compo-
nents. The largest weakly connected component has 1.1M
nodes (74.32% of the nodes) and 2.4M edges (91.37% of the
edges). Out of the 1.5 million users, about 9% of the users
have been suspended from the community. Figure 1(a) and
Figure 1(b) plot the complementary cumulative distribution
function (CCDF) for the degree of followers (indegree) and
followees (outdegree), respectively. The indegree and outde-
gree follow power-law distributions [3], with an exponential
fitting parameter α 3.53 and 2.95 respectively.
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Figure 1: (a) Indegree distribution; (b) Outdegree
distribution.
Along with the follower-followee social network, we built
an activity network (AN) that connects users if they inter-
acted with each other’s content. In the AN network, nodes
are users who answered other users’ questions, directed edges
point from the answerer to the asker. The activity net-
work has 1.2M nodes and 45M edges, thus being 141 times
denser (ratio of the number of edges to the number of pos-
sible edges) than the FF network.
4. FLAGGING IN YAHOO ANSWERS
In this section, we study whether flags (we use flags and
abuse reports interchangeably) can be used as an appropri-
ate proxy for content abuse. First, we investigate whether
the flags reported from users are typically valid, i.e. if hu-
man inspectors remove the flagged content and further, how
quickly this is done (Section 4.1). Then, we explore how
the flags can be used to detect content abusers (Sections 4.2
and 4.3).
4.1 Abuse Reports
YA is a self-moderating community; the health of the
platform depends on community contributions in terms of
reporting abuses. Besides participating by providing ques-
tions and answers, YA users also contribute to the platform
by reporting abusive content. Reporters serve as an interme-
diate layer in the YA moderation process since these abuse
reports are verified by human inspectors. If the report is
valid, the content is promptly deleted.
To check if valid abuse reports are indeed an accurate sen-
sor for the correct monitoring of the platform, we look at how
soon a report is curated. Figure 2 shows the distributions of
the time interval between the time when a content (question
or answer) is posted and when it is deleted due to abuse re-
ports. About 97% of questions and answers marked as abu-
sive are deleted within the same day they are posted. All
reported abusive questions and answers are deleted within
three days of posting.
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Figure 2: The CDF of the time delay between the
posting of the content (questions or answers) and its
deletion due to valid abuse reporting.
This result highlights two facts. First, the users moni-
toring the platform act very quickly on content: within 10
minutes from being posted, 50% of the bad posts are re-
ported. Second, the validation of abuse reports happens
within 3 days (and in vast majority within a day). Hence,
in our dataset, if there are abuse reports that did not have
the chance of being curated yet and thus we do not consider
them, those are too few to impact our analysis.
However, the abuse reporting functionality might be abused
as well, due to several reasons. First, reporting is an easy
and fast process, requiring only a few steps. Second, a user
is not penalized for misreporting content abuse, perhaps in
an attempt to not discourage users from exercising good cit-
izenship. And third, independent of their level in the YA
platform (that limits the number of questions and answers
posted per day), users can report an unlimited number of
abuses.
To check whether users abuse the abuse reporting func-
tionality, we compare the number of flags received/reported
with the number of validated flags received/reported per
user. Figure 3 shows a correlation heat map of the flags
received and flags received that are valid, as well as flags
reported and flags reported that are valid, on questions and
for all contributors (results on answers are similar and are
excluded for brevity). For questions (answers), we have a
very high correlation between flags received by users and
flags that are valid (r = 0.90 (0.87), p < 0.01) and between
flags reported by users and that are valid (r = 0.80 (0.92),
p < 0.01).
These high correlations indicate that, in general, users
are not exploiting the abuse reporting functionality. When
a user reports an abuse, it is very likely that the content is
violating community rules. Another interesting finding from
the correlation heat maps is that for both questions and an-
swers, users have almost negligible or very weak correlation
between the number of flags they reported that are valid
and the number of flags they received that are valid. This
hints that the good guys of the community are not bad guys
at the same time: the users who correctly report a lot of
content abuses are not posting abusive content themselves.
4.2 Deviant Users
Given that flags are good proxies for identifying bad con-
tent, how should they be used to detect content abusers and
thus determine which accounts to be suspended? Common
Flags_received
Flags_received_valid
Flags_reported
Flags_reported_valid
Flag
s_re
ceiv
ed
Flag
s_re
ceiv
ed_
valid
Flag
s_re
port
ed
Flag
s_re
port
ed_
valid
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Figure 3: The Pearson correlation coefficient heat
map of flags received, valid flags received, flags re-
ported and valid flags reported on questions. All
values are statistically significant (p-values <0.01).
wisdom might suggest that content abusers are those who
receive a large number of flags. Of the top 1% flagged askers
and answerers, we find 51.63% and 53.89%, respectively, are
suspended. But finding a threshold on the number of flags
received by a user is not likely to work accurately for con-
tent abuser detection: users with low activity who received
flags for all their posts might go below this threshold. At
the same time, highly active users may collect many flags
even if for a small percentage of their posts, yet contribute
significantly to the community.
This intuition motivated us to measure the correlation
between a user’s number of posts and the number of flags
received. Indeed, we find that the correlation between the
number of questions a user asks and the number of valid
flags she receives from others is high (r = 0.49, p < 0.05).
Similarly, the number of answers posted and the number
of valid flags received per user are highly correlated (r =
0.37, p < 0.05). The distributions of the fraction of flagged
questions and answers is shown in Figure 4. While about
27% users have more than 25% flagged questions, about 34%
users have more than 25% flagged answers. Also, about 16%
and 19% of users have more than 50% flagged questions and
answers respectively.
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Figure 4: Distributions of fraction of flagged ques-
tions and answers.
So, instead of directly considering flags, we define a de-
viance score metric that indicates how much a user deviates
from the norm in terms of received flags considering the
amount of her activity. Deviant behavior is defined by ac-
tions or behaviors that are contrary to the dominant norms
of the society [8]. Although social norms differ from culture
to culture, within a context, they remain the same and they
are the rules by which the members of the community are
conventionally guided.
We define the deviance score for a user u as the number
of correct abuse reports (flags) she receives over the total
content (question/answer) she posted, after eliminating the
expected average number of correct abuse reports given the
amount of content posted:
DevianceQ/A(u) = YQ/A,u − YˆQ/A,u (1)
where YQ/A,u is the number of correct abuse reports received
by u for her questions/answers, and YˆQ/A,u is the expected
number of correct abuse reports to be received by u for those
questions/answers.
To capture the expected number of the correct abuse re-
ports a user receives for questions/answers, we considered a
number of linear and polynomial regression models between
the response variable (number of correct abuse reports) and
the predictor variable (number of questions/answers) for all
users. Among them, the following linear model was the best
in explaining the variability of the response variable.
Y = α+ βX +  (2)
where Y is the number of correct abuse reports (flags) re-
ceived for the content, X is the number of content posts and
 is the error term.
In eq. (1), a positive deviance score reflects deviant users,
i.e., those whose deviance cannot be only explained by their
activity levels.
4.3 Deviance Score vs. Suspension
We found 105, 340 users with positive question deviance
scores and 121, 705 users with positive answer deviance scores.
Among the users with positive question deviance score, 31, 891
users (30.27%) have been suspended. Similarly, among the
users with a positive answer deviance score, 37, 633 users
(30.92%) have been suspended. The CDF of suspended and
deviant (but not suspended) users’ deviance scores for both
questions and answers is shown in Figure 5. In both cases,
suspended and deviant users are visibly characterized by
different distributions: suspended users tend to have higher
deviance scores than deviant (not suspended) users. While
this difference is visually apparent, we also ensure it is sta-
tistically significant using two methods: 1) the two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test, and 2) a permutation test,
to verify that the two samples are drawn from different prob-
ability distributions.
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Figure 5: The CDF of suspended and deviant users’
deviance scores for (a) questions; (b) answers. Dis-
tributions are different with p<0.001 for both KS and
permutation tests (for questions: D = 0.22, Z = 46.04
and for answers: D = 0.28, Z = 50.53.)
We also find that 63.94% of top 1% deviant question
askers’ and 64.77% of top 1% deviant answerers’ accounts
have been suspended. This hints that the higher deviance
score a user has, the more likely (s)he is to be removed from
the community. Figure 6 shows the probability of a user
being suspended as a function of its rank in the community
as expressed by deviance score and number of flags. We
observe that the more deviant a user is, the more probable
is that she will be suspended. Also, in all cases, deviance
score shows a higher probability of suspension compared to
the number of flags.
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Figure 6: Probability of being suspended, given a
user is within top x% of (a) question or (b) answer
deviance scores and flags. Local polynomial regres-
sion fitting with 95% confidence interval area is also
shown.
These results show that the deviance score is a better
metric for identifying the content abusers than the number
of flags is by itself. However, both metrics fail to identify
content abusers who go under the community radar. We
found that about 40% of the suspended users had never been
flagged for the abusive content they certainly posted, thus
maintaining a negative deviance score. Thus, our investiga-
tion into user behavior in the YA community continues.
5. DEVIANT VS. SUSPENDED USERS
Despite the fact that deviance score better identifies the
pool of suspended users, it is clearly an imperfect metric.
On one hand, there are high deviance score users who are
not suspended, despite the fact that the platform seems to
be fairly quick in responding to abuse reports. On the other
hand, there are “ordinary” users, according to the deviance
score (i.e., with a negative deviance score) who are never
reported for abusive content, yet get suspended. These users
may even be fair users for a long time, but sometimes their
posted content can be highly abusive (e.g., vulgar language
and images) that platform moderators immediately suspend
them. To better understand these two groups of users—
deviant but not suspended and suspended but not flagged—
we analyze in more detail their activity. Note that the two
groups are disjoint (i.e., deviant users have received at least
one flag).
5.1 Deviance is Engaging
One of the success metrics of CQA platforms is user en-
gagement [16], which can be measured by the number of
contributions and by the number of users who respond to
a particular content. Thus, we use the number of answers
deviant users receive to their questions and the number of
distinct users who respond to the deviant users’ questions as
measures of deviants’ contribution to user engagement with
the platform. To this end, for each category of users (typical,
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the number of
answers received by typical, deviant but not sus-
pended, and suspended users per question.
Type Min. 1st Qu. Med. Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
Typical 1.00 1.00 2.00 4.36 5.00 1296.00
Deviant 1.00 5.00 11.00 17.96 22.00 1205.00
Suspended 1.00 1.00 4.00 8.67 9.00 1144.00
deviant but not suspended, and suspended) we randomly
selected 500k questions they asked. For each question, we
extracted all answers received and also the users who an-
swered those questions. Table 1 presents the statistics of
the number of answers received per category of users.
Deviant users’ questions get significantly more answers
than typical users’s questions get: on average, a question
posted by a deviant user gets about 5 times more answers
than the average question posted by a typical user. This
difference is also seen in the CCDF of the number of an-
swers received by typical, deviant and suspended users in
Figure 7(a). The distributions (pairwise) are different with
pks < 0.01 and pperm < 0.01.
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Figure 7: (a) CCDF of the number of answers re-
ceived by the typical, deviant but not suspended,
and suspended users on questions; (b) CCDF of the
number of neighbors (distinct answerers) that typi-
cal, deviant but not suspended, and suspended users
have.
Deviant users not only attract more answers, but also in-
teract with more users than typical users do, as shown by
Figure 7(b) and these two distributions are different (pks <
0.01, pperm < 0.01).
This result from analyzing a random sample of 500k ques-
tions is confirmed when looking at the indegree of nodes in
the activity network, which represents the number of users
who answered that node’s questions, as shown in Table 2
for typical and deviant users. Deviant askers have a higher
number of neighbors than typical askers. An explanation
might be, as shown in [13], that users who ask conversa-
tional questions tend to have more neighbors (with whom
the asker has interaction) than users who ask informational
questions. This suggests that deviant users tend to ask more
conversational questions, which engage a larger number of
responders.
5.2 Deviance is Noisy
We observed that deviant users impact the quantity of
content in the system. Do they impact quality, too? To
address this question, we look at the percentage of the best
answers with respect to the total number of answers submit-
ted per user.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the number of
neighbors askers have in the Activity Network.
Type Min. 1st Qu. Med. Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
Typical 0.00 1.00 5.00 28.16 19.00 13270.00
Deviant 0.00 3.00 20.00 103.40 90.00 5698.00
Suspended 0.00 2.00 13.00 88.62 60.00 6576.00
Figure 8 shows the CDF of the percentage of best an-
swers for different classes of users: 1) typical, 2) deviant but
not suspended, and 3) suspended. The results show that
users who are moderately deviant but did not get suspended
have higher percentage of best answers than suspended users
(distributions are different pks < 0.01, pperm < 0.01), but
lower than that of typical users (distributions are different
pks < 0.01, pperm < 0.01).
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Figure 8: CDF of the percentage of best answers for
typical, deviant but not suspended and suspended
users.
To conclude, it turns out that while deviant users are ben-
eficial in terms of platform success metrics, as they increase
user engagement by attracting more answers and attracting
more users who answer their questions, they do not con-
tribute more than the norm-following users in terms of con-
tent quality.
5.3 The Suspended but Not Flagged Users
While the results above show how the deviant users dif-
fer from the suspended and from the typical users, we do
not have yet an understanding of the behavior of the users
who get suspended without other users flagging their abu-
sive content. An initial analysis of these users—suspended
but not flagged—shows the following particularities when
compared to the fair users (all users, independent of their
deviance status, who are not suspended).
First, they are followed by and follow significantly fewer
other users. Figures 9 (a) and (b) show the distributions
of indegree and outdegree of never-flagged-suspended users
compared to those of fair users. Not only these users have
smaller social circles, but they also have lower activity levels,
as shown in Figure 9 (c). Of course, these results could be
correlated: low activity may mean low engagement in the so-
cial platform. These results may also suggest that (some of)
these users join the platform for particular objectives that
are orthogonal to the platform purpose, such as spamming.
More importantly, however, these results suggest directions
that we present in the following.
6. MEMBERS OF THE NETWORK
We investigate how the social network defined by the follower-
followee relationships impacts user activities and behaviors
in YA. Our final goal is to understand how to separate fair
users from users who should be suspended even in the ab-
sence of flags. We learn that users close in the FF net-
work not only help each other by answering questions, but
also monitor each other’s behavior by reporting flags (Sec-
tion 6.1). Thus, the social network allows users to implicitly
coordinate their behavior so much so that users who are
socially close exhibit not only similar behavior, but also a
similar deviation from the typical behavior (Section 6.2).
6.1 Out of Sight, Out of Mind
We expect that users receive more answers from users that
are close in the social network. To verify this intuition, we
randomly selected 7M answers such that both parties of the
interaction (the user who posted the question and the user
who answered it) are in the social network, and measured
the social distances between the two users. For a user u and
a social distance h, the probability of receiving an answer
from followers at distance h is the following:
ph =
# of u’s followers at distance h who answered u’s questions
# of u’s followers at distance h
(3)
Figure 10 plots the geometric average of all these proba-
bilities at a given distance as a function of social distance.
The figure confirms that the probability of receiving answers
from h-hop followers decreases with social distance.
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Figure 10: Probability of getting answers from h-
hop followers. Local polynomial regression fitting
with 95% confidence interval area is also shown.
Therefore, the FF network channels user attention, likely
via its newsfeeds feature that sends updates to followers
on the questions posted by the user. Does the same phe-
nomenon hold true for abuse reports?
To answer this question we investigate both networks:
along with the FF which is an explicit network, we also
investigate the activity network (AN ), which connects users
based on their direct question-answer interactions. For each
(reporter, reportee) pair in the editorially-curated abuse re-
ports, we calculated the shortest path distance between them
in the social network and the activity network. We com-
pare our results with a null model that randomly assigns
the abuse reports in our sample dataset to users in the two
networks.
Figure 11 shows the percentage of abuse reports users re-
ceive from close distances (up to 8 hops) for both (social and
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Figure 9: Distributions of (a) indegree; (b) outdegree and (c) number of questions and answers (QA) of never
flagged suspended users and fair users (for outdegree: D = 0.28 and Z = 27.40, p < 0.001, for indegree: D = 0.17
and Z = 15.86, p < 0.001 and for activity: D = 0.30 and Z = 40.30, p < 0.001).
random) cases. About 75% of the reports that users receive
are from reporters located within 5 social hops in the FF
network. However, when reports are distributed randomly,
about 9% are from within 5 social hops and very few from
within 3 social hops.
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Figure 11: Percentage of the abuse reports received
by users from different distances in the social net-
work, for the observed case and a random case.
When comparing the percentage of abuse reports users
receive with respect to distance in the AN (Figure 12), we
notice that 94% of reports come from users within the first
3 hops, which is significantly higher than the social network
(about 32%). We believe this is due to the high density of
AN : most of the nodes are reachable from others within a
few hops. However, even in this denser network, the null
model has only about 10% of reports applied from within 3
hops.
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Figure 12: Percentage of the abuse reports received
by users from different distances in the activity net-
work, for the observed case and a random case.
To further quantify this phenomenon, we calculate the
probability of being correctly flagged by users located at
different network distances in the social and the activity
network. For a user u and a social distance h, the probability
of being flagged by followers at distance h is the following:
ph =
# of u’s followers at distance h who flagged u
# of u’s followers at distance h
(4)
Figure 13 plots the geometric average of all probabilities
at a given distance against the social distance for both net-
works. As expected, the probability decreases with social
distance in both the social and the activity networks. The
plot shows that users are likely to receive flags from others
close to them in terms of social relationships and interac-
tions.
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Figure 13: Probability of being flagged by h-hop fol-
lowers in the: (a) social network, and (b) activity
network. Local polynomial regression fitting with
95% confidence interval area is also shown.
These results confirm that the abuse reporting behavior
is dominated by social relationships and interactions: users
are reported for content abuse more from their close social
or activity neighborhoods than from distant users. The un-
derlying reason is likely content exposure: a user’s contents
(questions/answers) are disseminated to nearby followers,
thus they get higher exposure to that content compared to
more distant users in the social graph. Similarly, users who
interact frequently with a user are more probable to view
her contents and to report the inappropriate ones.
6.2 Birds of a Feather Flock Together
Similarity fosters connection– a principle commonly known
as homophily, coined by sociologists in the 1950s. Homophily
is our inexorable tendency to link up with other individuals
similar to us [17]. In this section, we investigate whether
homophily is also present in terms of deviance–that is, if
Table 3: Assortativity coefficient r for deviance
scores in the YA network. Assortativity coefficients
are also shown for other social networks from [19].
Yahoo! Answers Other Social Networks
Question deviance r = +0.11 Mathematics coauthorship r = +0.120
Answer deviance r = +0.13 Biology coauthorship r = +0.127
deviant users tend to be close to each other in the social
network.
One way to conclude about the homophily of a network is
to compute the attribute assortativity of the network [20].
The assortativity coefficient is a measure of the likelihood
for nodes with similar attributes to connect to each oth-
ers. The assortativity coefficient ranges between -1 and 1; a
positive assortativity means that nodes tend to connect to
nodes of similar attribute value, while a negative assorta-
tivity means that nodes are likely to connect to nodes with
very different attribute value from their own. If a network
has positive assortativity coefficient, then it is often called
assortative mixed by the attribute, otherwise called disas-
sortative mixed.
In this work, we used question and answer-based deviant
scores. We considered each of the scores as an attribute and
calculated the assortativity coefficient r based on [19] for
each type of deviance. The assortativity coefficients r are
shown in Table 3 and are positive. In [19], Newman studied
a wide variety of networks and concluded that social net-
works are often assortatively mixed (Table 3 offers two such
examples), but that technological and biological networks
(e.g., World Wide Web r = −0.067, software dependencies
r = −0.016, protein interactions r = −0.156) tend to be
disassortative. Comparing them quantitatively with the as-
sortativity coefficients of the YA network, we conclude that
the YA network is assortatively mixed in terms of deviance.
So, users having contacts with (low)high deviance scores will
also have (low)high deviance scores.
We next measure how similar the deviance scores of a
user’s contacts are with the user’s, and how this similarity
varies over longer social distances. For this, we randomly
sampled 100k users from the social network for each social
distance ranking from 1 hop to 4 hops. Let Uh be the set
of all the users (100k) selected for the social distance h. We
calculated the probability that user u’s h-hop contacts (with
u ∈ Uh) will have the same deviance score as:
pu =
# of u’s followers at distance h with same deviance score
# of u’s followers at distance h
(5)
Rather than computing the exact similarity between a
user and her follower’s deviance scores, we focused on whether
their difference is small enough to be dubbed as the same.
We considered two users’ deviance scores are the same if
their corresponding deviance score difference is less than a
“similarity delta”. More specifically, u will have about the
same deviance score with user s located at distance h if:
|devianceu − deviances| < δ (6)
The same technique was used for both types of deviance
scores.We experimented with two values for δ equal to one
or two standard deviations of the distribution of deviance
scores in the network. We report the geometric average of
all pu probabilities computed in each hop h.
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Figure 14: Probability that a h-hop follower has the
same deviant score to the user for δ = σ and δ = 2σ.
SD: standard deviation.
Figure 14 shows the probability plots for both types of
deviance, keeping similarity δ equal to one or two standard
deviations. Although different values of the δ, the shapes of
the figures are almost the same: up to 3-hops, the probabil-
ity decreases gradually with the social distance.
7. SUSPENDED USER PREDICTION
Based on our previous analysis, we extract various types
of features that we use to build predictive models. We for-
mulate the prediction task as a classification problem with
two classes of users: fair and suspended. Next, we describe
the features used (Section 7.1) and the classifiers tested (Sec-
tion 7.2), and demonstrate that we are able to automatically
detect fair from suspended users on YA with an overall high
accuracy (Section 7.3).
7.1 Features for Classification
Our predictive model has 29 features that are based on
users’ activities and engagements e.g., social, activity, ac-
complishment, flag and deviance. Table 4 shows the differ-
ent categories of features used for the classification. Social
features are based on the social network of the users, where
Activity features are based on community contributions in
the form of questions and answers. Accomplishment features
acknowledge the quality of user contribution (e.g., points,
best answers). Flag summarizes the flags of a user (both re-
ceived and reported). Deviance Score features are the scores
that we have computed based on users’ flags and activities.
Finally, Deviance Homophily represents the homophilous be-
havior with respect to deviance. Although most of the fea-
tures are self-explanatory, below we clarify the ones which
may not be.
Reciprocity. Reciprocity measures the tendency of a
pair of nodes to form mutual connections between each other [12].
Reciprocity is defined as follows:
r =
L
L∗
where L is number of edges pointing in both directions and
L∗ is the total number of edges. r = 1 holds for a network
in which all links are bidirectional (purely bidirectional net-
work), while a purely unidirectional network has r = 0.
Status. Defined as the ratio of the number of a user’s
followers to her followees.
Thumbs. The difference between the number of up-votes
and the number of down-votes a user receives for all her
answers.
Award Ratings. The sum of the ratings a user receives
for her best answers.
Altruistic scores. The difference between a user’s con-
tribution and his takeaway from the community. For altru-
istic scores, we consider YA’s point system, which awards
two points for an answer, 10 points for a best answer, and
penalizes five points for a question:
Altruistic scoresu = f(contribution)− f(takeaway)
= 2.0 ∗Au + 10.0 ∗BAu − 5.0 ∗Qu (7)
where Qu is the number of questions posted by u, Au is the
number of answers posted by u, and BAu is the number of
best answers posted by u.
Table 4: Different categories of features used for
fair vs. suspended user prediction. We create a
reciprocated network from the reciprocated edges.
CC: clustering coefficient.
Category Number Features
Social 6
Indegree
Outdegree
Status
Reciprocity
Reciprocated networks degree
Reciprocated networks CC
Activity 4
#Questions
#Answers
#Flagged Questions
#Flagged Answers
Accomplishment 5
Points
#Best Answers
Award Ratings
Thumbs
Altruistic scores
Flag 8
#Question Flag Received
#Question Flag Received Valid
#Question Flag Reported
#Question Flag Reported Valid
#Answer Flag Received
#Answer Flag Received Valid
#Answer Flag Reported
#Answer Flag Reported Valid
Deviance Score 2
Question deviance score
Answer deviance score
Deviance Homophily 4
Followers’ question deviance score
Followers’ answer deviance score
Followees’ question deviance score
Followees’ answer deviance score
7.2 Experimental Setup and Classification
In our dataset, the percentage of fair users (about 91%)
are high compared to the suspended users (about 9%). This
leads to an unbalanced dataset. Various approaches have
been proposed in the machine learning literature to deal with
the problem of unbalanced datasets. We use the ROSE [18]
algorithm to create a balanced dataset from the unbalanced
one. ROSE creates balanced samples by random over-sampling
minority examples, under-sampling majority examples or by
combining over and under-sampling. Our prediction dataset
has 250k users with 60-40% training–testing split. Using
the under and over sampling technique of ROSE, we sample
150k users (fair and suspended each class has 75k users) to
train the classifier. The testing set has 100k users, who are
not present in the training dataset. They are drawn ran-
domly and fair vs. suspended ratio in the testing dataset is
the same as the original YA dataset.
We tested various classification algorithms, including Naive
Bayes, K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN), Boosted Logistic Re-
gression, and Stochastic Gradient Boosted Trees (SGBT).
We use individual feature sets to investigate how successful
each feature set is by itself, and then use all features for
prediction. For evaluation, we measure widely used metrics
in classification problems: Accuracy, Precision, Recall and
F1-score. Table 5 shows a summary of our experimental
setup.
Table 5: Details of experimental setup.
Dataset 250k sampled users
Class Balancing Alg. Random Over-Sampling Examples (ROSE)
Classifiers Stochastic Gradient Boosted Trees (SGBT)
Naive Bayes, Boosted Logistic Regression
K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN)
Support Vector Machines RDF
Feature Sets Social, Activity, Accomplishment
Flag, Deviance Homophily, All features
Train-Test Split 150k users training, 100k users testing
Cross Validation 10-folds, repeated 10 times
Performance Accuracy, precision, recall, F1 score
7.3 Classification Results and Evaluation
The performance results of various classifiers while using
all features are shown in Table 6. The SGBT classifier out-
performs other classifiers in all performance metrics. This
classifier offers a prediction model in the form of an ensemble
of weak prediction models [11]. In our setting, it achieves
82.61% accuracy in classifying fair vs. suspended users with
a high precision (96.94) and recall (83.52). The confusion
matrix of the classifier is shown in Table 7. The matrix
shows that the SGBT classifier is able to correctly classify
83.52% of fair users and 73.39% of suspended users.
Table 6: Performance of various classifiers using all
available features.
Classifier Name Accuracy Precision Recall F1 Score
Naive Bayes 47.21 96.93 43.34 59.89
Boosted Logistic Regression 71.61 96.62 71.28 82.03
KNN 73.81 96.41 73.97 83.71
SVM-RDF 75.92 95.62 77.06 85.34
SGBT 82.61 96.94 83.52 89.73
Table 7: Confusion matrix for the SGBT classifier.
Actual
Fair Suspended
Predicted Fair 83.52% 26.60%
Suspended 16.47% 73.39%
Figure 15 shows the performance (accuracy, precision, re-
call and F1 score) of the models trained with different sub-
sets of features using the SGBT classifier, which performs
the best among the tested classifiers. We observe that each
feature set has a positive effect on the performance of the
classifier across all performance metrics. This suggests that
all our feature sets are important for prediction. Particu-
larly, accomplishment, deviance, flags and activity features
individually exhibit more than 70% accuracy with good pre-
cision, recall and F1 score. However, when all the features
are used for classification, the performance metrics yield the
best results, i.e., accuracy is improved by 4.11% compared
to activity features.
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Figure 15: Performance of the SGBT while classify-
ing fair and suspended users using different feature
sets.
Figure 16 shows the most important features (top 15) in
classification of fair vs. suspended users. The model uses a
backwards elimination feature selection method for feature
importance. For each feature, the model tracks the changes
in the generalized cross-validation error and uses it as the
variable importance measure.
We observe that the number of flagged content and de-
viance scores are the best predictors of fair and suspended
users. Also, at least one feature from all feature sets is
within the top 15 features. However, only activity and de-
viance score feature sets have all the features within the top
15 features.
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Figure 16: Relative importance (out of 100, how
much a feature is contributing) of top 15 features in
classifying fair and suspended users.
8. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
This paper is an investigation of the flagging of inappro-
priate content in Yahoo Answers, a popular and mature
Community-based Question-Answering platform. Based on
a sample of about 10 million flags in a population of about
1.5 million active users, our analysis revealed the following.
First, the use of flags is overwhelmingly correct, as shown
by the large percentage of flags validated by human moni-
tors. This is an important learning for crowd sourcing, as it
shows for the first time (to the best of our knowledge) that
crowdsourced monitoring of content functions well in CQA
platforms. Moreover, although there are no explicit incen-
tives (e.g., points) for flagging inappropriate content, users
take the time to curate their environment. In fact, 46% of
the users reported at least one abuse report, with the top
abuse reporters flagging tens of thousands posts.
Second, we discovered that many users have collected a
large number of flags, yet their presence is not deemed toxic
to the community. Even more, their contributions are en-
gaging, which is certainly a benefit to the platform: the
questions asked by the users who deviate from the norm
(in terms of number of flags received for their postings) re-
ceive many more answers and from many more users than
the questions posted by ordinary users or by users who later
had their accounts suspended. However, more content-based
analysis is needed to understand how exactly the deviant
users engage the community. We posit that they might ask
conversational, rather than informative, questions, as this
behavior is shown to increase community engagement.
Third, we showed the importance of the follower-followee
social network for channeling attention and producing an-
swers to questions. Less expected, perhaps, is the fact that
this network also channels the attention of flaggers: we found
that users in close social proximity are more likely to flag
inappropriate content than distant users. Social neighbor-
hoods, thus, tend to maintain their environment clean.
Fourth, a significant problem in YA is posed by the users
who manage to avoid flagging, possibly by remaining at the
outskirts of the social network. This relative isolation in
terms of followers and in terms of interactions probably al-
lows such users to remain invisible. They are likely caught by
automatic spam-detection-like mechanisms and by paid hu-
man operators. However, our empirical investigation showed
that classifiers that use activity- and social network-based
features can successfully identify fair and suspended (40% of
them are not flagged) users with accuracy as high as 83%.
This work leads to various promising directions for future
work. Understanding what makes deviant users engaging
can be helpful in designing strategies potentially applicable
to a variety of communities. Quantifying the equivalent be-
havior in terms of content abuse reporting and in terms of
bad users on different online platforms can help understand
the relative importance of different features for the success of
the platform. And finally, characterizing (e.g., activity and
social network centrality) the pro-social users who report
abusive content may help identify such potential volunteers
and appropriately incentivize them.
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